This paper investigates the distribution of crime and violence across victims in Colombia.
Introduction
Many studies have sought to understand the main factors underpinning the dramatic escalation of violent crime in Colombia, but only few have attempted to investigate how the heightened crime levels have differentially affected the different sectors of the Colombian population. Little is known, then, about the distribution of crime and violence across victims and about how individuals and households have responded to the escalation of violence. This paper addresses two main issues. First, it investigates the distribution of crime and violence across victims. And second, it investigates the different strategies used by households to deal with the higher levels of crime and violence, emphasizing the differences among income groups in their propensities to invest in crime avoidance.
Needless to say, if one wants to know who bears the burden of crime and violence, one must necessarily take into account the direct welfare losses from exposure to episodes of crime and violence, and the amount of resources allocated by households to prevent crime (in the form of both time and outright expenditures). While one might observe, for example, that rich households are less likely to be victims of a crime, this might just be a reflection of their much larger expenditures in crime avoidance.
We find that, at least in the main metropolitan areas of the country, rich households bear a disproportionate share of the burden of property crime. They are more likely to be victimized, to modify their behavior because of fear of crime, to feel unsafe in their cities, and to invest in crime avoidance. This result may explain the growing sense of malaise among rich and middle-class Colombians, many of which have left the country while others loudly demand a firmer stance of the government against crime and violence.
In contrast, poor, and in particular uneducated, individuals bear a disproportionate share of domestic violence. Women from the bottom quintile of the income distribution are 15 percentage points more likely to suffer from domestic violence than women from the top quintile. More importantly, each year of schooling reduces the probability of domestic violence by more than one percentage point. It should be noted that domestic violence is much more prevalent than criminal violence: it affects almost half of Colombian households while criminal victimization affects less than ten percent of them.
Section 2 of this paper presents a brief overview of crime and violence in Colombia.
Section 3 describes the main sources of data. Section 4 lays out the empirical strategy and presents the empirical results. Section 5 presents some caveats. And Section 6 concludes.
Crime and Violence in Colombia: an overview
The magnitude of violent crime in Colombia is staggering. The homicide rate in this country is three times higher than in Brazil or Mexico, and ten times higher than in Argentina or the United States. Even compared to other Latin American countries, where violent crime has been increasing steadily for years, violence in Colombia appears disproportionate (see Figure 1 ). Only El Salvador and Jamaica have comparable homicide rates and no other country in Latin America (or in the world, for that matter) has comparable kidnapping rates.
But Colombia has not always been a violent country. In the early 1970s, the homicide rate in Colombia was not very different from that of its neighboring countries. Starting in the late 1970s, the homicide rate escalated dramatically and by the early 1990s had more than tripled (see Figure 2) . At its peak in the early 1990s, the homicide rate reached epidemic proportions in some cities. Over four in a thousand individuals were murdered in Medellín in 1991. Other metropolitan areas, notably Cali and Bogotá, experienced comparable levels of violence during the same period.
Since the mid-1990s, the homicide rate in the main metropolitan areas of the country has been falling. By contrast, kidnappings have escalated dramatically during the same period. Recent statistics from the Colombian National Police show that kidnapping rates have grown at an annual rate of almost 25 percent since 1995. According to an oft-cited figure, 60 percent of all kidnappings in the world take place in Colombia. Approximately half of these kidnappings are attributed to leftist guerrillas, but this proportion can be much higher.
Surprisingly, the levels of property crime in Colombia are not exceptional. In a recent paper, Gaviria and Pages (2000) show that the percentage of urban households that had at least one member victimized during 1998 is not greater in Colombia than in Latin America as a whole. This figure is based on data from the Latinobarometer, a public opinion survey covering the main urban agglomerations of 17 Latin American countries (see Figure 3 ). In the same vein, data from the International Victimization Survey show that burglaries, robberies and auto thefts are not more prevalent in Colombia than in various Latin American countries, including Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay (see Rubio and Levitt, 2000) .
Most studies looking at the causes underlying the escalation of violent crime in Colombia underscore the role played by drug trafficking. Two different mechanisms are mentioned in this respect. First, the fight over the control of drug markets as well as the inherently murderous nature of the drug business caused an increase in the homicide rate. And second, the emergence of drug trafficking congested law enforcement institutions and contributed to the dissemination of criminal know-how, amplifying the initial effect and ultimately catapulting the level of violence to the staggering levels recorded at the beginning of the 1990s. and recruit more people. As a result, the guerrillas have adopted a more aggressive and proactive stance, turning a sleepy conflict into a civil war. But despite the escalation of the conflict, most homicides in Colombia still take place in the main urban areas of the country, away from the coca fields and the area of influence of the guerrillas.
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In Colombia, income inequality has deteriorated significantly during the last decade, bringing social justice issues to the fore and reinforcing the widespread belief that poverty and inequality underlie the high levels of violence of the country. This belief notwithstanding, the available evidence offers little support to the idea that poverty and inequality have played a significant role in the escalation of violence. For one thing, all studies investigating the determinants of violence across Colombian municipalities find a direct relationship between homicide rates and socioeconomic development.
3 Figure 4 shows, for example, that there is a positive connection between the homicide rate of a municipality and an index of living conditions based upon average access to public services and average dwelling characteristics. For another, many studies show that inequality, though positively correlated to homicide rates at the municipal level, explains only a small fraction of the differences in these rates both across municipalities and over time.
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This paper examines the relation between inequality and crime from another perspective:
it focuses on what income groups bear most of the burden of crime and violence in Colombia, leaving aside the quest for the causes of the escalation of crime and violence. In our definition, a violent crime occurs if the respondent reports that any member of her household was a victim of an aggravated assault, a homicide or a kidnapping. The survey doesn't distinguish between incidence of violent victimizations is also greater in Bogotá than in any of the other cities included in the survey. The latter result is somewhat perplexing, as official homicide rates are much greater in Medellín and in Cali than in Bogotá 6 . Cartagena stands out for its low victimization rates and Ibague for its low levels of perceived criminality. Table 3 shows the propensity of households to engage in a variety of anti-crime strategies. 7 More than 80 percent of the respondents report that they do not go out at night because of fear of crime and more than 70 percent report that they don't go out alone for the same reason. 28 percent of the households have anti-theft devices, 37 percent robberies and common thefts. 6 This discrepancy can be explained by different regional propensities to self-report violent victimizations or by a much greater incidence of assaults in Bogotá. 7 These percentages are based on a series of questions to this effect included in the second round of the survey. The same questions were not included in the third round of the survey, which hampers any attempt to study the connection between the incidence of victimization and the propensity of household strategies to invest in crime avoidance. The survey asked whether any member of the household owns a TV set, a refrigerator, a washing machine, a personal computer, a car and a second home and whether the place of residence has access to water, sewage, electricity and a phone line. 9 Principal Components are often used to approximate socioeconomic status in the absence of reliable income data. The ability of this type of indices to predict consumption has already been tested in Colombia. Two widely used proxy mean test indexes, Indice de Calidad de Vida and Sisben, use information about durable goods and dwelling characteristics to predict household welfare levels--see Sarmiento et. al (1996) and Vélez et. al (1999) . Filmer and Pritchett (1998) show that in the case of India durable goods and housing attributes are observed with more precision than consumption expenditures, and that indicators of socioeconomic status based on these variables are less sensitive to temporary disturbances on household welfare than similar indicators based on consumption data. 10 See Morrison and Loreto (1999) for are thorough discussion of the consequences of the domestic violence as well as of the policies to deal with it. The last round of the ENDS survey was conducted in the first semester of 2000. More than 10,000 women were interviewed in both urban and rural areas of the country. We restrict the sample to women living in urban areas in order to allow comparability with the other victimization results. 
Methodology and Estimation Results
Economic models of crime focus mainly on the incentives faced by prospective criminals. These models offer clear predictions as to what determines the overall level of crime, but not as to what determines the distribution of crime across victims. In particular, these models offer few clues as to whether crime is disproportionately borne by the poor (or by the rich, for that matter). This and related questions are important not only because their obvious fairness implications, but also because their answers can provide some insights on the root causes of crime and violence and about the best public policies to fight these problems.
The empirical section of this paper has three distinct parts. The first explores the distribution of crime across victims, the second explores the distribution of household investments in crime avoidance and the third the distribution of domestic violence. Our empirical strategy relies on the following model:
where Y ij is a dummy variable showing whether any member of family i who lives in city j was a victim of a crime during the six months prior to the survey, X ij is a vector of observable household characteristics (including education of the household head and relative socioeconomic status) and ε ij is an individual error term.
We use a Probit model to estimate equation (1). Linear probability models yield almost identical results, suggesting that our findings are robust to the choice of estimation method. City fixed effects are included in some specifications in order to control for unobserved city characteristics that may affect the distribution of crime across victims.
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Our main findings are also robust to the presence of city fixed effects.
Distribution of Crime across Victims
11 One may argue that individuals living in safer cities are more likely to report minor incidents as instances of victimization. City-fixed effects control for this and related measurement problems.
Our main results concerning the effect of household relative socioeconomic status on the probability of victimization are summarized in Table 5 . 12 The probability of victimization is very similar for the first three quintiles, slightly higher though not significantly so for the fourth quintile, and substantially higher for the top quintile. On average, the richest 20 percent of the population has a probability of victimization at least seven percentage points higher than the poorest 60 percent. 13 This result holds up after controlling for household attributes and city fixed effects, though the significance drops somewhat in the latter case.
Households that have a business in their place of residence are ten percentage points more likely to be victimized than households that do not. This finding indicates that crime is especially taxing on small entrepreneurs, thus suggesting that the economic effects of crime, from slower economic growth to stifled job creation, are large. Femaleheaded households have also a higher probability of being victimized, as do households whose head is older than 25. Surprisingly, households in which the head is unemployed are also more likely to be victimized, which may reflect a greater exposure to risk caused by job searching o loitering--the main activities of the unemployed. Whatever the reason, the fact is that a heightened victimization risk appears to be a hitherto unknown cost of being unemployed, at least during the current escalation of joblessness in Colombia. Table 6 shows the effects of household attributes on the probability of being the victim of a violent crime. Households from the third quintile are less likely to be victims of violent crimes, which is caused by the higher incidence of homicides in the lowest quintiles and the higher incidence of kidnappings in the highest. The probabilities of having a household member murdered are 2.4 percent for households from the bottom quintile, 1.2 percent for households from the third quintile and 0.6 percent for households from the top quintile. The corresponding probabilities of having a household member kidnapped are 0.0 percent, 0.1 percent and 2.8 percent. Lastly, female-headed households are at least 12 All results are marginal effects evaluated at the mean of the dependent variable. 13 According to the Colombian household survey for June of 2000, the annual income per capita of an urban household located in the 80 th percentile is around US$ 7000 dollars. It follows that some households of the top quintiles ("rich") in Colombia can be poor by O.E.C.D. standards.
four percentage points more likely to be victims of a violent crime, which is partly driven by the fact that several of these households had the former head murdered. Table 7 shows that households from the top quintile are much more likely to report feeling unsafe because fear of crime than households from any other quintile; a result consistent with the higher probability of victimization among the richest households mentioned above. 15 The results also show that households from the bottom quintile are at least ten percentage points less likely to report feeling unsafe and that households from the intermediate quintiles don't differ much on their propensity to report the same feeling.
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The Fear of Crime among the Better-off
Households headed by individuals 60 or older have a lower propensity to report feeling unsafe than households headed by younger individuals (perhaps because they don't have small or teenage children to worry about). By contrast, migrant households are more likely to feel unsafe in their new city of residence (perhaps because they have to face an unfamiliar and often hostile environment). Households in which the head is unemployed are also slightly more likely to feel unsafe, though the difference is not significant and very small when compared to the much higher propensity of these households to have a member victimized.
In sum, the previous results show that the richest households are not only more likely be victims of property crimes, but also more liable to report feeling unsafe. The former finding is consistent with the Latin American evidence as reported by Gaviria and Pages (2000) . These authors show that in Latin America households from the top quintile are at least seven percentage points more likely to have a member victimized than households from the bottom quintile. By contrast, the evidence reported by Levitt (1999) shows that 14 Whereas more than three percent of all female-headed households had a family member murdered in the six months prior to the survey, less than one percent of all male-headed households had to experience the same ordeal. The kidnappings rates do not differ much between these two types of households and the assault rates are slightly higher in households headed by women. 15 The question asks whether people feel unsafe because of one of following reasons: high levels of crime, presence of gangs, social conflict and inadequate protection against crime.
in the United States the opposite pattern holds: poor American households are more likely to be victimized (and the tendency is toward a greater concentration of crime among them).
(1) (2) Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level The first quintile is the reference group. Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level The first quintile is the reference group. Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level The first quintile is the reference group. The previous results also show that the probability of being a victim of a violent crime doesn't depend much on the socioeconomic status of the households. While no comparable evidence exists for other countries of Latin America, a recent study by Levitt (1999) shows that the incidence of homicides in Chicago, though still borne disproportionately by the poor, has recently become more evenly distributed across socioeconomic strata.
Distribution of Anti-Crime Strategies: the better-off engage much more intensively in preventive strategies
One can't determine who bears the burden of crime without examining who engages in anti-crime strategies and who doesn't. In principle, rich households should be more prone to engage in such strategies, if only because they have more to lose from property crime.
But if they believe that the probability of being victimized is independent of their actions, they may well opt for not doing anything or for doing very little. In particular, Gaviria and Pages (2000) show that if household investments in crime avoidance have sharp diminishing returns, the rich may opt for not investing at all even at the expense of a greater victimization risk.
16 Table 8 shows that household from the top quintile are much more likely to have antitheft devices in their homes, to participate in neighborhood watching programs and to hire private guards. For the latter strategy, the differences between the top and bottom quintiles is almost 50 percentage points and the difference between the fifth and fourth quintile is more than 20 percentage points. For the other two strategies, the differences among quintiles follow a similar pattern though they are smaller in magnitude.
17
Households from the top quintile are also more likely to avoid road trips than households from any of the other quintiles. The same is true for not going out at night and not going out alone, though the differences in these two cases are not statistically significant. In general, the propensity to engage in anti-crime strategies increases monotonically with socioeconomic status. Moreover, the differences between contiguous quintiles become larger and larger as we move from bottom to top, suggesting the presence of a nonlinear pattern. Figure 5 illustrates the latter point using a specific example. The thin line shows, for each quintile, the percentage of households that have private guards in their homes or
condominiums. The bold line shows, also for each quintile, the fraction of households that had at least one member victimized in 1999. The richest households not only have a higher probability of being victimized, but also a much higher propensity to hire private guards. On the whole, this figure reinforces the idea that the burden of property crime is disproportionately borne by the better-off: they are more likely to be victims of property crimes, more likely to feel unsafe and more likely to engage in anti-crime strategies.
The previous result may explain the growing sense of malaise among rich and middle class households; many of which have left the country while others loudly demand a firmer stance of the government against crime and violence. Figure 6 shows, for example, that the rich and middle-income are much more likely to migrate abroad than the poor.
Whereas almost four percent of households from the top quintile had a member who left the country during 1999, no households from the two bottom quintiles had a member doing the same.
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Domestic Violence: the other side of the coin Table 9 shows that poor and uneducated women are more likely to be victims of domestic violence. The probability of being a victim of domestic violence raises as much as 10
percentage points as we move from the bottom to the top quintile. This is so not only for the most common forms of aggression, but for the most serious incidents as well.
18 The data also show that household that have been victimized are twice as likely to leave the country as household than do not. By contrast, there are sizable differences in the propensities to migrate between However, the effect of relative socioeconomic status on the probability of being a victim of domestic violence shrinks substantially and loses its significance completely after controlling for both the years of education of the individual and those of the household head. In sum, lack education rather than lower socioeconomic status appears to be the main risk factor in the case of domestic violence.
As shown, each year of schooling reduces the probability of victimization by 1.5
percentage points if all incidents of domestic violence are considered and by 0.9
percentage points if only serious incidents are considered. Further, each year of education of the household head reduces the probability of being a victim of domestic violence by 0.7 percentage points. Surprisingly, women who hold regular jobs are more likely to suffer from domestic violence than women that do not. All reported results are robust to the inclusion of regional dummies.
In sum, unlike the distribution of crime across victims, domestic violence affects mainly poor and uneducated individuals. Lack of education, not only of the prospective victim but of the prospective perpetrator as well, is the main predictor of the incidence of domestic violence. Interestingly, this is even more so when the most serious types of aggression are considered.
households that have experienced substantial income reductions and households that haven't. Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses. * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level Probits were used in all models with exception of the last one. 
Caveats
Several caveats are in order. First and foremost, this paper does not say anything about rural households, which are the main victims of the massacres and attacks routinely executed by paramilitary and rebels groups. Second, the data sets used does not include households living in irregular settlements built after 1993, simply because these settlements are not part of the official maps used in the sampling process. And third, the paper doesn't control for differences among quintiles in the propensities to report crimes.
Arguably, the rich may report as crimes lesser offenses that are regarded by the poor as inevitable nuisances of city life.
However, these caveats are not likely to alter the main conclusions of this paper. First, the available evidence shows that crime and violence are disproportionately concentrated in the main cities of the country, despite the growing criminal incursions of leftist revels and paramilitary groups. Second, while poor households living in new settlements are, by design, excluded from the sample, equally poor households living in older neighborhoods are included. If the prevalence of crime and violence doesn't differ substantially between Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level The first quintile is the reference group. these two groups, one shouldn't expect big biases stemming from the exclusion of the former. And third, the poor are as prone as the rich to complain about poor public services and the quality of public institutions, which doesn't square with the view of stoic poor households that do not report crimes because they consider them an inherent part of their lives.
Conclusions
The results of this paper show that the better-off bear most of the burden of crime and violence and the worse-off bears most of the burden of domestic violence.
Arguably, the disproportionate concentration of property crime among the better-off have huge economic consequences, from lower levels of investments and growth to higher migration rates among the educated. For its part, the concentration of domestic violence among the worse-off, besides its effects on the well being of the victims, deteriorates the quality of family life, increases the probability of behavioral problems among children and ultimately reduces socioeconomic mobility and contributes to perpetuate poverty
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As long as rich and middle class Colombians continue feeling defenseless outside their homes and poor Colombians experience similar feelings inside theirs, the possibility of recovering economic prosperity in an atmosphere of peace is seriously compromised.
Herein lies then the main challenge for Colombia society in the years to come.
Source: Gaviria and Pages (2000) Homicide rate refers to the number of homicides per 100,000 people. Propensity to migrate refers the probability to leave the country during 1999. 
